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Abstract
In the public debate sparked by the corporate scandals of the last years, Delaware has
been strikingly absent.  In contrast to the high profile activity of Congress, the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the stock exchanges, federal prosecutors, and even state law
enforcement officials, Delaware has been largely mute: no legislation; no rule-making; no
criminal investigations; few headlines. In this Article, we use Delaware’s relative passivity
during this latest episode of corporate law-making as a starting point in the analysis of the shape
of American corporate federalism and Delaware’s place within it.
We argue that Delaware long ago opted for what we will call a “classical” or “19th
century” common law model of corporate law-making.  In Delaware, corporate law is largely
judge-made; judicial opinions are filled with quasi-deterministic reasoning; statutory law is
comparatively narrow and rarely subject of partisan disputes; the judiciary as well is relatively
non-partisan and has claim to technical expertise; and the law is enforced through litigation
brought by private parties.  We view these traits through the lens of the institutional and political
landscape in which Delaware must operate.  This landscape is characterized by a federalist
system in which Delaware’s regulatory powers co-exist with, and can be constrained by, the
powers of the federal government.  In this system, Delaware is faced with the threat that populist
pressures will lead to a federal preemption of Delaware corporate law and thus eradicate the
huge profits Delaware derives from being the domicile of choice for public-traded U.S.
corporations.  By creating and enhancing an apolitical gloss over Delaware’s corporate law, the
various traits we identify help shield Delaware against this threat. At the same time, the scope of
Delaware’s corporate law is designed to minimize conflicts by assuring that Delaware has the
requisite personal jurisdiction over defendants to enforce its law effectively and that the
prevailing conflict rules point to substantive Delaware law as applicable to a corporate law
dispute. 
But this classical model of law making carries with it intrinsic limitations. Specifically, 
legal change is slow, standard-based and incremental.  Faced with the recent corporate scandals,
calls for action, and Sturm und Drang, Delaware reacted accordingly:  Basically, it does nothing
until cases are brought.  Any more pro-active response by Delaware actors would have
threatened to undermine the political legitimacy achieved by Delaware’s commitment to the
classical common law model. But because the classical common law style, together with
jurisdictional and conflict rules, constrain Delaware, federal law is needed to complement
Delaware’s. In that respect, the relation between federal law and Delaware law is symbiotic,
rather than antagonistic: Delaware is happy to have federal law pick up the slack and thereby
reduce the likelihood that ineffective regulation produces a populist backlash.
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1 Zealous States Shake Up Legal Status Quo -- Oklahoma's MCI Case Is Latest Headache for Federal
Officials and Corporate Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at A4 (noting that 20 have passed or are considering
their own version of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and that some of the laws are tougher than the federal regulations);
Governor Signs Bill to Tighten Corporate Accounting Practices, SEC. & L. RPTR., Sep. 2, 2002, at 1446 (describing
California measures going beyond those of Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
2 See District Attorney - New York County News Release, Sep. 12. 2002, available at
www.manhattanda.org/whatsnew/press/2002-09-12.html (announcing indictment of Tyco’s former CEO, CFO and
Chief Corporate Counsel).
3  The literature on this question is expanding.  Important recent contributions include Stephen Bainbridge,
The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION (Spring 2003); Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003);  Robert Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 99
(2003); Robert Thompson & Hillary Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections on Federalism,
56 VANDERBILT L. REV. 859 (2003).
4  And, in answering that question, we turn back to the classic articulation, Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M.
Sacks, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW  (William Eskridge &
Philip Frickey, eds. 1994).
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Introduction
Enron.  Worldcom.  Adelphia.  Global Crossing.  Tyco.  Corporate scandals have made
the front pages.  Congress has gotten in the act.  Members have held numerous hearings, given
speeches, and, ultimately, passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Securities and Exchange
Commission has been busy writing regulations and leaning on the stock exchanges to modify
their listing requirements, all in order to restore “investor confidence.”  Federal prosecutors have
indicted executives of Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia and their minions in the auditing and
investment banking industry.  State officials have also been active. Several states have passed
statutes that resemble or go beyond the strictures of Sarbanes-Oxley.1  Robert Morgenthau, the
Manhattan District Attorney, has indicted the CEO and others officers of Tyco.2  And Eliot
Spitzer, New York’s Attorney General, has taken on the brokerage houses and, perhaps
following in the footsteps of Rudolf Giuliani, another renowned prosecutor of corporate
criminals, vastly increased his political standing.  The leaders of corporate America have been
galvanized to action, forming committees and task forces, issuing reports, and giving speeches.  
But where has Delaware been through all this?  No bills have been introduced in
Delaware’s legislature; no hearings held by its committees; its law enforcement agents have
taken no action; and its executives have staid mum.  How is it that Delaware – the home of what
has long been viewed as the de facto national corporate law – has sat on the sidelines?  
In this Article, we take a step back from the recent scandals and the responses it has
generated and ask some logically prior questions.  What is the structure of corporate law making
in the United States?  What is the relation between federal and state corporate law making?3 
And how does that relationship shape the style and content of Delaware's corporate law?  In a
sense, we are asking an old question: what is the corporate “legal process”?4
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From this legal process perspective, we argue that Delaware long ago opted for what we
will call a classical or 19th century common law model of law making.  We argue further that this
serves to preserve Delaware’s status as a significant maker of corporate law.  But this old model
of law making entails some intrinsic limitations, including that legal change is slow, standard-
based and incremental.  These limitations explain how Delaware responded to the recent
corporate scandals and, in turn, create a space where the relationship between federal law and
Delaware law is symbiotic rather than antagonistic. 
In Part I, we analyze the institutional and political landscape of corporate law-making. 
Although Delaware exercises a significant law-making role, it is faced with an omnipresent
specter of a federal takeover, which could eradicate the substantial income the state derives from
franchise fees.  The principal threat for Delaware is the possibility that federal intervention will
be triggered by a situation in which systemic change generates significant populist political
payoffs.  This danger is aggravated by Delaware’s apparent lack of democratic legitimacy: why
should a small state set national policy for corporate law?  It is in Delaware’s interest to structure
its law to minimize its exposure to such an attack.  In addition, Delaware must take account of
the rules on personal jurisdiction and on conflicts of law embedded in the federal structure.
Part II identifies a number of salient traits that characterize Delaware’s corporate law. 
Most important and controversial legal rules are the product of judge-made law.  Judicial
opinions are filled with quasi-deterministic reasoning.  Statutory amendments to the corporation
law are initially drafted by a bar committee, are adopted without change and debate by the
legislature, and address largely technical and non-controversial matters.  Delaware’s judiciary
has substantial expertise on corporate law and is non-political.  In contrast to Delaware’s first-
rate system for the private enforcement of corporate law rules, public enforcement is virtually
non-existing. And the scope of corporate law is largely confined to the regulation of the internal
affairs of a corporation.
In Part III, we argue that these traits can be understood as adaptations to the political and
institutional landscape in which Delaware operates. In many respects, Delaware’s corporate law
may the last vestige of the classical 19th century common law model in America: most important
legal rules are promulgated by a nonpartisan, expert judiciary; these rules are presented as
derived from long-standing and widely accepted principles; the law is enforced through civil
litigation brought by private parties; and even legislative amendments generate neither debate or
controversy. All this has the effect of creating and enhancing a technocratic, apolitical gloss over
Delaware’s corporate law and thus helps to shield Delaware from being attacked for the lack of
democratic legitimacy.  At the same time, the scope of Delaware’s corporate law is designed to
minimize conflicts by assuring that Delaware has the requisite personal jurisdiction over
defendants to enforce its law effectively and that the prevailing conflict rules point to substantive
Delaware law as applicable to a dispute.
In Part IV, we assess Delaware’s response to the recent corporate scandals and the
division of corporate law-making roles between Delaware and the federal government.  We
argue that Delaware’s response to the scandals – or rather the lack thereof – flows from its
5 See Roe, supra note 3, at 607-620 (discussing topics where federal rules have displaced state rules). For a
fuller discussion of the constitutionality of such Congressional action, see footnote _ infra..
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adherence to the classical common law model. Faced with corporate scandals, calls for action,
and Sturm und Drang, Congress held hearings and passed sweeping legislation and Eliot Spitzer
crusaded against Wall Street.  But Delaware has to wait until a legal dispute is brought in its
courts, and even then can address the issues only in an incremental fashion.  While this means
that Delaware has been out of the limelight, and may have hurt Delaware’s image in the short
term, staying out of the political limelight is in Delaware’s long-term interest.  Spitzer may be a
successful politician, and he may even be the right Attorney General for New York, but he
would not be the best person to assure that hundreds of millions in annual franchise fees keep
flowing into Delaware’s coffers.  But because the classical common law style, together with
jurisdictional and conflict rules, constrain Delaware, federal law is needed to complement
Delaware’s. This is so where Delaware’s common law regime cannot effectively supply the
optimal legal regime – e.g. because it is requires public enforcement or is highly regulatory – or
where the rules on personal jurisdiction or conflicts inhibit Delaware’s ability to regulate. In that
respect, the relation between federal law and Delaware law is symbiotic, rather than antagonistic:
Delaware is happy to have federal law pick up the slack and thereby reduce the likelihood that
ineffective regulation produces a populist backlash.
I. The Landscape of Corporate Law Making
In this Part, we examine the division of corporate law making between federal and state
authorities.  We provide a stylized description of two related landscapes of corporate law-making
–  the institutional and the political – and analyze the powers of and constraints placed on law-
making by federal actors and by Delaware.
A. The Institutions of Corporate Law Making.
Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the allocation of corporate law-making
authority in the United States.  Congress sits at the top of the chart.  There is little constitutional
doubt that, if Congress wished to legislate a national corporate law that would displace all state
corporate law, it could do so pursuant to its power under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.5
Given this authority, Congress faces several options.  It can legislate corporate law
directly, enacting either a comprehensive corporate law or discrete elements.  It can set relatively
broad standards and then establish an administrative agency, such as the Securities and Exchange
Commission, with subsidiary lawmaking powers. It can set broad standards and leave it to courts
to adjudicate cases and develop the law through a common law process. It can enact enabling
provisions which leave the task of making specific rules to the domain of private choice. Or it
can do nothing and thereby leave the regulation of corporate conduct to the states. 
6  State legislatures’ freedom of action in this regard may be subject to some Constitutional constraints.  See
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (Illinois antitakeover statute that applied to companies with tenuous
contact to state violates Commerce clause).
7  Hart & Sacks, supra note 4, at 163 - 164.
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If Congress is willing to allow the states to act, the states then face similar options: to
legislate directly; to establish an administrative agency; to let courts develop rules through the
common law process; or to enact enabling provisions. In addition, states must determine the
applicable “choice of law” rules: should the applicable law be the law of the corporation’s state
of incorporation, should it be the law of its principal place of business, or should a forum state
apply its own law even if the ties of the corporation to the state are more tenuous?6 
Abstracting for the moment from public choice concerns (to be covered in the next
section), a public-regarding legislature, in deciding how best to legislate in the corporate area,
would need to consider a variety of factors.  First, there is the question of institutional
competence.  Promulgating detailed fine-grained rules requires a certain level of institutional
infrastructure that an administrative agency, like the Securities and Exchange Commission may
possess, but that a legislature is likely to lack.  Second, there is the question of the appropriate
degree of decentralization: Is a uniform national rule optimal? Is it better to allow for diversity
among the states?  To what extent should companies be permitted to set their own rules?  
But Figure 1 only provides part of the picture.  For people who focus on corporate law, a
picture of corporate lawmaking that puts Congress at the top and the Delaware courts, as a subset
of other state courts, towards the bottom fails to capture who the important corporate law actors
are.
If one focuses not on lawmaking power but on lawmaking role, a different picture
emerges.  Consider, in this regard, Figure 2.   Figure 2 recognizes that courts, in the process of
resolving disputes, often have the first opportunity to address problems through law-making.  As
Hart & Sacks pointed out:
In the development of Anglo-American legal systems, courts have functioned
characteristically as the place of initial resort for the settlement of problems which have
failed of private solution. ... [T]he body of decisional law announced by the courts in the
disposition of these problems tends always to be the initial and continues to be the
underlying body of law governing the society.  Legislatures and administrative agencies
tend always to make law by way not of original solution of social problems, but by
alteration of the solutions first laid down by the courts.7   
The Hart & Sacks notion of courts as first-line law-makers provides an important modification of
the picture of law-making authority in Figure 1. In the first instance, a myriad of corporate law
disputes are brought to the Delaware Chancery Court.  Other corporate law disputes are brought
8 See, e.g., Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Services, 907 F.Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
9 By parties, we mean interest groups and political actors that have a stake in the legal rule announced in a
case, rather than the specific parties to the litigation.
10 An example of this is the enactment of Section 102(b)(7) in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985).
11 An example here is the SEC’s reversal of the discriminatory self-tender defense sanctioned in Unocal. 
See Dennis J. Block et al., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE (5th ed. 1998) at 1010.
12 An example is the prohibition of loans to executives in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  See Roberta Romano,
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND THE MAKING OF QUACK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Working Paper 2004.
13 See infra Section I.A.  (detailing several instances where rules on insider trading announced by federal
courts have been reversed by Congress or the SEC). Since federal courts sometimes also interpret state law, some
federal court rulings can also be reversed by state legislatures.
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to the federal courts or the courts of other states.8 In resolving these disputes, courts will often be
the first body to address a problem though law-making.
Consider Figure 2 in more detail.  Controversies arise among corporations, managers,
investors and between corporations and employees, regulators, citizens and others.  When these
controversies become legal disputes, they can go either to the Delaware courts, other state courts,
or the federal system. Which forum parties resort to for litigating their disputes, in turn, is
influenced and sometimes determined by two additional elements peculiar to the U.S. federal
system.   The first element concerns personal jurisdiction.  Under the due process clause of the
U.S. constitution, state courts can assert jurisdiction only over defendants who have the requisite
minimum contacts with the forum state.  The second concerns the rules on conflict of laws. 
These rules, which are part of the law of each state, determine the law of which jurisdiction
applies to a dispute.  Under the prevailing rules on conflict of laws, the law of the state of
incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation.  However, with respect to other
issues, these rules will rarely point to the law of the state of incorporation as governing a dispute. 
But, as shown in Figure 2, public controversies will occasionally avoid the legal
machinery entirely.  Instead, such controversies are brought to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or directly to either the state legislature or to the U.S. Congress.  Moreover, once a
legal dispute has been adjudicated by the courts, parties interested in the legal rule9 promulgated
face a decision whether to accept the result or to seek to have it changed.  For disputes
adjudicated within the Delaware system, the choices are to turn to the Delaware legislature,10 to
go to the Securities and Exchange Commission11, or to turn to Congress.12  Similarly, parties
dissatisfied with the legal rules emerging from federal court adjudications can turn either directly
to Congress or to the SEC.13 
14  Ronald Dworkin, LAW’S EMPIRE, at 239-74; Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at Chapter 4. 
15  For a contrary view, see Thompson & Sale, supra note 3.
16 Our view of the threat of federal intervention thus differs in subtle, but important, ways from Mark Roe’s
recent insightful analysis of the issue.  Roe regards the federal authorities as having some independent substantive
policy preferences.  In order not to trigger federal intervention, state rules must match or come close to these
preferences.  See Roe, supra note 3, at 607.  As discussed in this section, we see federal intervention as a product of
either interest group lobbying (where interest groups have both preferences for the actual content of legal rules and
the identity of the regulator) or populist politics and regard the latter as the more serious threat.
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While, in Figure 1, members of the Delaware judiciary may appear to be little more than
secondary actors, Figure 2 indicates that Delaware judges can have a critical role.14  Whether
they do or not depends on where disputes are litigated and how often the Delaware legislature or
federal lawmakers intervene.  As discussed in Part II, Delaware courts adjudicate, in the first
instance, most corporate law disputes involving public corporations that raise issue addressed by
state law15 and the Delaware legislature rarely intervenes.  As discussed in Part III, this manner
of law-making serves to fend-off federal intervention.
B. The Politics of Federal Intervention
Figures 1 and 2 also provide a starting point for understanding the politics of federal
intervention in corporate law making.  Generally, Delaware exercises the first-line rule-making
role for much of corporate law, mostly because Delaware courts are in the forefront of resolving
corporate disputes. A significant prospect of change can arise only if a significant interest group
is highly dissatisfied or if political actors foresee political benefit from advocating legal
change.16  Even when there is a prospect for such change, however, there are forces pushing
back.
17 Piecemeal reform can also come from the Securities and Exchange Commission, with a somewhat
different sort of political dynamic. See, e.g., Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution,
Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003, at A1 (describing various reasons for SEC’s cautious
approach to regulation); Headline Risk at the SEC, Wall St. J., May 10, 2004, at A16 (accusing SEC of adopting
cumbersome regulations for their headline value). Historically, there have been a variety of more or less pervasive
SEC incursions into the traditional topics of Delaware corporate law.  The more confined incursions include rules
governing: going private transactions; tender offers; and dual class re-capitalizations.  The more pervasive ones
include the proxy rules that govern shareholder voting and insider trading rules. Without delving deeply into the
politics of agency rule-making, one can note that the Securities and Exchange Commission is subject to many of the
same pressures as Congress, and that, when the key constituencies are satisfied with the status quo, SEC attempts to
expand its reach can usually be resisted. And of course, the SEC can only act to the extent that Congress has
delegated the requisite authority and can be overridden by Congresses or the courts if it steps out of line. See
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
Stock exchanges also have the ability to act, either on their own behest or because of SEC pressure.  While
the exchanges have wider latitude to make corporate law rules than the SEC does, they are constrained by their
desire to attract listings and by competition from other exchanges.  They may thus be reluctant to adopt rules
opposed by managers who exercise control over where companies are listed (more so than over where they are
incorporated).  More fundamentally, exchanges lack enforcement powers.  The most serious sanction – delisting – is
hardly credible when there are competing exchanges, and, moreover, hardly a consolation for shareholders who are
supposedly helped by the rules.  For this reason, only clear-cut rules by the exchanges that create no ex post
ambiguities have real bite (if a violation is obvious, most companies won’t dare to do it, even if enforcement is
weak). See generally Edward B. Rock, Securities Regulation as Lobster Trap: A Credible Commitment Theory of
Mandatory Disclosure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 675 (2002).  
18 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992) (arguing that state competition leads to rules biased
towards managerial interests); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 88
YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that state competition results in a race to the bottom).
19  There is no plausible constitutional argument that Congress would not have the power, under the
Commerce Clause, to preempt state corporate law with a national corporate law.  Article I, section 8, of the U.S.
constitution (the “Commerce Clause”) grants Congress the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and
among the Several States.”  This has been expansively interpreted. For good, comprehensive discussions, see
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d Ed. 2000) §§5-4 - 5-5; Erwin Chemerinsky,
CONSITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (2d Ed. 2002) § 3-3.  From 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court did
not hold a single Congressional action to be beyond the regulatory power conferred by the Commerce Clause.  Id.
During this period, for example, the Supreme Court held that Congress had Commerce Clause power to regulate
stock in public utilities, American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946) and to regulate interstate
insurance transactions, US v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  Indeed, the Commerce
Clause is the sole jurisdictional basis for all of federal securities regulation.  
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Consider the possibility of Congressional intervention:17 suppose that some politicians
become convinced that interstate competition for corporate charters results in a race to the
bottom18 or favor a federal takeover of state corporate law for more naked political
considerations.  How might parties favoring the status quo resist such a move?  
One possible argument might be constitutional, namely, that such a wholesale
displacement of state corporate law would be beyond Congress’s powers under the Commerce
Clause. As a matter of contemporary Constitutional law, this is a weak –  indeed, nearly
laughable – argument.19  In light of Congress’s constitutional ability to intercede directly and to
In a line of cases beginning in 1995, the Supreme Court indicated that there exist limits to Congress’s
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause.  U.S. v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 549 (1995) (gun free school zones act held
unconstitutional); U.S. v. Morrison, 529 US 598 (2000) (civil damages provision in the Violence Against Women
Act held unconstitutional). See, also, U.S. v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (interpreting federal law narrowly to avoid
constitutional doubts whether Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause with regard to arson);
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(same with regard to migratory birds).  Chemerinsky, §3.3.5.  But this line of cases focuses entirely on the extent to
which Congress can regulate non-commercial or non-economic activity under the Commerce Clause.  There is no
suggestion in the opinions, nor in subsequent case law, that the judicial skepticism would extend to indisputably
commercial activity such as securities regulation or corporate governance.  
The only genuine Commerce Clause issue that has recently arisen in corporate and securities law is the
extent to which the Supremacy Clause or the (dormant) Commerce Clause preempts or precludes state regulation of
takeovers.  See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624 (1982); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481
U.S. 69 (1987).  In CTS, in which the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s control share acquisition statute, the court
held that the statute did not violate the commerce clause as it did not discriminate against interstate commerce, nor
subject corporations to inconsistent standards.  Neither case raises any question as to Congress’s power to preempt
state corporate law in the area of tender offers; only about whether Congress, in fact, intended to do so, and, in the
case of CTS, whether, in the absence of any such intent, the Commerce Clause otherwise precluded the states from
acting.
20  While one might speak of a “corporate law federalism,” it is more (descriptively) accurate to think of the
distribution of corporate law-making as “decentralization.” Edward L. Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV.  903, 910-14  (1994).  Whatever the general persuasiveness of
Rubin and Feeley’s view, in corporate law it is accurate: the extent of Congress’s power under the Constitution to
legislate in the corporate area is such that “our corporate law federalism” is a matter of an implicit or explicit
decentralization driven by bureaucratic, political and legal process factors, as we discuss in greater detail in the text.
21 Letter by Chief Justice Veasey, Delaware Supreme Court, to Alan Beller, Director of Division of
Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission, Mar. 11, 2004 (expressing reservations about proposed
SEC rule on shareholder nominations because rule would “intrude upon and may be in conflict with corporate
internal affairs that are the province of state law.”) (copy in possession of authors).
22  The U.S. Supreme Court has been solicitous of states’ primacy in corporate law.  See, e.g., CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51
L.Ed.2d 480 (1977).
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shift corporate law making authority among the various players, the “internal affairs” doctrine --
according to which the internal affairs of a corporation are governed by the law of the state of
incorporation -- is better thought of as contingent allocation of responsibility based on prudential
considerations than any sort of iron dictate.  
But even if a frontal Constitutional attack is weak, the underlying themes of “corporate
federalism” or “cooperative federalism”20 and states’ rights have significant political and legal
salience.  It could, in other words, be an effective policy argument in the halls of Congress or the
offices of the SEC.21  It could also provide the basis for an argument to courts when they
interpret ambiguous federal legislation.22
23  [2001-2002] Cong. Index (CCH) 11,501-502 (Aug. 23, 2002).
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But, of course, the course of legislation is only partially determined by such policy and
legal arguments.  Interest groups matter too.  Figures 1 and 2 provide a useful guide to those
actors with sufficiently large interests to get involved politically.  The constituents with an
interest in corporate law are primarily managers and investors, with several other groups, such as
lawyers and employees, taking a secondary interest in corporate law rules.  To the extent that
managers are opposed to a change in the law, organizations such as the Business Roundtable
would lobby against it. To the extent that institutional investors are opposed, one would expect
them to lobby as well.  Moreover, Delaware is itself interested in limiting federal intrusions into
corporate law and Delaware’s interests are influentially represented.  For example, during the
107th Congress, when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted, both Delaware senators were on
committees that considered the bill:  Joseph Biden on the Judiciary Committee and Thomas
Carper on the Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs committee.23
Finally, the Constitution and internal Congressional rules make it easier to stop
legislation than to enact it.  To pass a law, legislation must ordinarily be approved by
Congressional committees; be put on the agenda by the Congressional leadership; be approved
by majorities in both houses of Congresses; either not be filibustered or favored by a
supermajority of the Senate; and either be approved by the President or favored by veto-proof
majorities in both houses. As a result, a determined minority of legislators can often block
legislation favored by a majority. 
To be sure, even with this build-in status quo bias, Delaware must keep the principal
organized interest groups affected by Delaware corporate law reasonably satisfied in order to
avoid federal intervention.  For several reasons, however, we do not regard federal intervention
due to interest group pressure as a major threat for Delaware. 
First, “satisfied” in this context relates not only to the specific legal rules in force but
more generally to a judgment of comparative institutional competence – namely, which
lawmaking institution is likely to perform better over the long term.  Even if managers and
investors are dissatisfied with a particular substantive rule of Delaware law, there are a number
of plausible reasons why they may nevertheless not push for federal intervention. First, they may
believe that they will carry more relative weight in Delaware than in any of the alternative
federal institutions, perhaps because employees or SEC bureaucrats will be more influential at
the federal level.  Second, Delaware may be more responsive to new developments, have greater
expertise in applying rules, or otherwise be able to devise rules that are superior to those likely to
emerge from federal actors.  Third, it may be less costly to influence Delaware than Congress or
the SEC.  And fourth, a federal system may be viewed as a less risky forum because, for
example, it is less likely to generate radical legislation or because it affords greater opportunities
to opt-out of legislation (by changing corporate domiciles) than a monopolist federal regulator.
24 Codified in section 16 (b) to (f) of the Securities Act. Technically, the act makes most securities class
actions removable to federal court.
25 See, e.g., Spehar v. Fuchs, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10406, n. 4  (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that Section
16(d) of the Securities Act is known as the “Delaware carve-out”).
26 Section 16(d).
27 Class Action Fairness Act, 2003 S. 274.2003 H.R. 1115.
28 Similarly, Senator Biden has  been able to block the enactment of a 1997 proposal by the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission to eliminate state of incorporation as a venue for bankruptcy cases.  See David
Skeel,  Bankruptcy Judges and Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thought on Delaware, 1 DEL. L. REV. 1, 44 (1998). 
Although Delaware derives some benefits from being a venue in major bankruptcy cases, these benefits pale in
comparison to those from being the domicile of most publicly traded companies.  See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar,
The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 67, 694 n. 50 (2002)
29 To be sure, the relative power of investors and managers may differ from the incorporation and
reincorporation contexts to the context of federal lobbying, thus providing some incentives for the group that is more
powerful in the lobbying context to seek federal intervention.  But the direction of that difference is unclear,
unstable, hard to predict, and is likely to be small. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 18, at 740-741, 743-745.
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Second, even when Congress has enacted legislation otherwise trampling on states’ right,
it has historically taken special care not to intrude upon Delaware.  For example, the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act,24 which in effect deprived state courts of jurisdiction over
securities class actions for misrepresentations or deceit and eliminated the states’ ability to apply
their own securities laws on misrepresentations or deceit in class actions, contains the so-called
“Delaware carve-out”25 which specifically exempts actions for misrepresentations based on the
corporation law of a company’s state of incorporation from its provisions.26  Similarly, the
proposed Class Action Fairness Act, designed to assure that most class actions with a national
class of plaintiffs are adjudicated in federal court, specifically excludes corporate law class
actions arising under the law of the company’s state of incorporation.27  Perhaps not
coincidentally, Delaware’s Senator Carper is one of six original sponsors (and one of a handful
of Democratic supporters) of the Senate version of the act.  For one reason or another,
Delaware’s corporate law seems to enjoy great respect on Capitol Hill.28 
Most importantly, however, Delaware has strong incentives to keep investors and
managers satisfied even apart from the possibility of federal intervention.  Investors and
managers control incorporation decisions of companies when they go public and decisions of
existing public companies to reincorporate.  As Delaware caters anyway to investors and
managers in order to attract incorporations, keeping investors and managers sufficiently satisfied
that they do not lobby for federal intervention should thus not require much additional effort or
adjustment.29 Moreover, to the extent that particular investors and managers are dissatisfied, it is
usually much easier for them to induce a particular firm to incorporate in a different state than to
lobby for a change in federal law.
30 For example, the press describes Eliot Spitzer’s actions as populist.  See, e.g., John Cassidy, The
Investigation: How Eliot Spitzer Humbled Wall Street, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 7, 2003 at 54 (“Spitzer was well
placed to launch a populist crusade”); Spitzer’s Grandstand, WALL ST. J., MAR. 5, 2004, at A14 (“New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer fancies himself as a populist hero for assailing Wall Street misdeeds ...”).
31  For examples from the history of U.S. regulation of business, see Mark Roe, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK
OWNERS (1994) Chapter 4.
32 See also Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH . U. L.
Q. 849, 850 (1997) (most new regulations follow stock market crashes).
33 See, e.g., Romano, supra note 12 (discussing how act is product of political entrepreneurship, rather than
interest group lobbying); Headline Risk at the SEC, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2004, at A16 (accusing SEC to adopt
cumbersome mutual fund regulations for their headline value).
34 See Cary, supra note 18.
35 See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Rogue State: The Case Against Delaware, NEW  REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2002 at
20; Triumph of the Pygmy State, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2003 (questioning why the laws of state with .3% of
population governs more than half of public corporations); Cary, supra note 18. 
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A greater concern than federal intervention due to interest group pressure is the
possibility that federal intervention will be triggered by a situation in which systemic change will
be seen as generating a significant populist political payoff (a payoff unrelated to interest group
pressure).30  Such situations can arise in times of crisis or scandal or due to political
entrepreneurship.31
 High profile scandals can shift the balance of power both in Congress and, derivatively,
at the Securities and Exchange Commission, by triggering a deep, populist theme in American
politics and energizing broad, loosely organized constituencies. The classic examples of large
scale federal incursion into corporate law in response to crisis and scandal is the enactment of the
1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, which created the SEC and, more
recently, the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the changes in the stock exchange listing
rules.  Here, we had major scandals that coincided with the bursting of a stock market bubble
that left investors licking their wounds and looking for someone to blame.32  Congressional
hearings were held and there was a feeling that “something must be done.”  Congress felt
pressure to act, and act it did.33 
The danger of a populist backlash against Delaware is aggravated by the lurking
argument that Delaware lacks political legitimacy.  Why should a small state - a “pigmy”, as a
leading proponent of a federal corporate law referred to it pejoratively34 – have so significant a
law-making role for national corporate law and, in the process, derive huge profits?  From the
perspective of democratic theory, would it not make more sense if the members of Congress,
elected by all U.S. citizens, made the law affecting corporations with national operations and
shareholders?  It is against this background lack of democratic legitimacy that populist appeals
for federal intervention will be made and resonate.35
36 Cf. Roe, supra note 3 (focusing on the role of federal regulation as Delaware’s competition); Bebchuk,
supra note 18 (calling for replacement of state law by federal law); Cary, supra note 18 (same); Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359 (1998) (calling for
wholesale repeal of federal securities regulation and replacement by state law). 
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Alas for Delaware, it can do nothing to deprive Congress of its power to enact corporate
laws and little to prevent crises, scandals, or the emergence of political entrepreneurs.  What
Delaware can do, however, is structure its law in a manner adapted to preserving its scope and
reduce the likelihood that it will become the target of systemic change. 
As we discuss in Part III, many traits of Delaware corporate law can be understood as
adaptations to the institutional and political landscape in which Delaware, as the leading supplier
of corporate law, must operate. This landscape includes Delaware’s constitutional and political
vulnerability to federal intervention and the strictures imposed by jurisdictional and conflict
rules. Our claim is not that Delaware purposefully adopted these traits to serve its aims.  We do
not believe that the connection is that direct. Rather, the claim is that key patterns of Delaware
corporate law making are consistent with the Delaware actors being sensitive to their
institutional role and its limitations.  Even if these pattern have not been purposefully adopted,
the fact that they serve this function contributes to their survival.
Finally, we will argue in part IV that not every federal intervention into corporate law is
against Delaware’s interest.  Because of the political constraints placed on Delaware by its desire
to avoid systemic change, and because of the legal constraints imposed by jurisdictional and
conflict rules, Delaware cannot effectively regulate certain types of misconduct.  In these areas,
which include much of traditional securities regulation, Delaware should have no major problem
with federal regulation.  To the contrary, Delaware may favor federal intervention to the extent
that it makes the corporate law system as a whole less scandal prone and reduces the chances of
a populist backlash against Delaware as principal regulator. Thus, the relationship between
federal and state regulation in corporate law is, in our view, more symbiotic and less antagonistic
than generally presumed.36
II. Salient Traits of Delaware Corporate Law
Delaware’s corporate law has a number of salient and characteristic traits.  These traits
concern its style, the manner in which it is enforced, and its scope.  In this Part, we explore
Delaware corporate law’s traits in six areas: the breadth of its judge-made law; its quasi-
deterministic judge-made law; the making of its statutory law;  its judiciary; its enforcement
mechanism; and the overall scope of its corporate law.  As we will explain in the next Part, all
these traits can be seen as adaptations to the peculiar landscape in which Delaware, a tiny state
that is the leading supplier of corporate law, must operate. 
A. The Breadth of Judge-Made Law
37 See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Ind., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
38 See, e.g., Gagliardi v. TriFoods Internation, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996).
39 See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 18.
40 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
41 See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
42 See, e.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987).
43 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis,  473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
44 See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
45 See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
46 See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
47 See, e.g., Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
48 See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis,  473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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The most noteworthy trait of Delaware’s corporate law is the extent to which important
and controversial legal rules are promulgated by the judiciary, rather than enacted by the
legislature.  In Delaware, judge-made law, to the virtual exclusion of statutory law, governs
fundamental issues such as fiduciary duties of directors, officers, and controlling shareholders,
the prerequisites for a derivative suit, and disclosure obligations.  Even powers that the Delaware
code explicitly accords to the board of directors are subject to a judicially created and interpreted
duty not to use these powers for “inequitable purposes.”37  Thus, judge-made, rather than
statutory, law governs issues such as:
• when directors are liable (the famous business judgment rule);38
• what counts as a self-interested transaction;39
• who is regarded as a controlling shareholder;40
• the scope of a controlling shareholder’s obligations;41
• the legal test to determine the validity of a self-interested-transaction;42
• when a director is considered “independent;”43
• the legal effect of approval of a transaction by independent directors or by
disinterested shareholders;44
• what constitutes a “corporate opportunity”;45
• the legal tests regulating takeover defenses;46
• when a board can take actions that interfere with shareholder franchise;47
• when a shareholder can institute a derivative suit without making a prior demand
on the board;48
49 See, e.g., Mabon, Nugent & Co. v. Texas American Energy Corp., 1988 Del. Ch. Lexis 11 (1988).
50 See, e.g., Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594
A.2d 48 (Del. 1991).
51 See, e.g., Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339 (Del. 1983).
52 See id.
53 Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225
(1985) 
54 35 Ind. Code Ann. §23-1-35-1.
55 Id. Code §30-1-860.
56 Cal. Corporations Code, Sec. 160.
57 Ohio Code 1701.59.
58 Mich. Comp. Laws, Sec. 50.1495.
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• when shareholders lose their limited liability;49
• limitations on charitable giving;50
• the right of contestants to be reimbursed for expenses incurred in proxy contests;51
and
• when officers and directors are entitled to indemnification.52
Neither historic contingency nor the nature of the legal rules at issue fully explain this
breadth of judge-made law.   To be sure, the law of fiduciary duties has historically been
developed by the judiciary. Nevertheless, Delaware’s judge-made law is distinctive in a number
of ways.  First, Delaware, whose economic well-being depends on the franchise revenues it earns
from public corporations, should be expected to pay significant attention to the way its law is
generated.  Other states, who do not derive significant economic benefits from chartering
companies, may be affected by inertia and inattention with respect to the structure of their
corporate laws. In Delaware, however, where franchise taxes account for 20% of the state
budget,53 historical artifact cannot, by itself, explain why the legislature has not taken a more
active role.
Second, even though fiduciary duty law has historically been judge-made, many states
other than Delaware have statutorily revised portions of fiduciary duty law.  For example,
Indiana has a statute governing a board’s fiduciary duties in a takeover contest;54 Idaho’s statute
defines “conflicting interest”;55  California’s statute defines “control”;56 Ohio’s statute revises the
burden of proof in shareholder lawsuits;57 Michigan’s statute defines a special class of
independent directors and accords them special rights in derivative proceedings;58 over 30 states
passed statutes permitting a board to consider broader interests in discharging their fiduciary
59 Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795 (2002).
60 Rev. Model. Bus. Corp. Act, §§ 8.30 and 8.31[8.60-8.63] The Comment notes that these rules “spell[] out
a practical working definition of ‘conflicting interest’ [and are designed to create] “bright line specificity and
predictability”. 2 Model Bus. Corp. Act Annotated §§8.60-8.63 Introductory Comment at 8-386 (3rd ed. 1996). 
61 Rev. Model. Bus. Corp. Act, §§ 7.40 - 7.46
62 Schnell, 285 A.2d at 437.
63 Blasius, 564 A.2d at 651; MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
64 Block et al., supra note 11, at 499-500.
65 See, e.g., Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Tech., Inc., 968 F.Supp. 1578, 1581 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (declining
to follow Blasius); Solfanelli v. Aminwaring, 1992 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 18883, at *13 (E.D.Pa. 1992) (no duty of
disclosure under Pennsylvania law).  Most states have not had occasion to determine whether they adopt these new
doctrines.
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duties;59 and the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, adopted by over 20 states, codified
the standards of conduct for liability of directors60 and the standards for commencement and
dismissal of derivative suits.61  Delaware law, by contrast, contains no equivalent statutory
provisions.  Thus, corporate law is judge-made in Delaware to a greater extent than in most other
states.
Third, the Delaware judiciary has taken the lead in expanding the breadth of judge-made
law beyond its traditional domain.  Judicial decisions in Delaware have thus created novel
doctrines regulating actions by a board of directors that are taken for inequitable purposes62 or
that are intended to interfere with shareholder franchise63 and have minted a new fiduciary duty
of disclosure.64  While these new doctrines can all be justified as complementing traditional
fiduciary duties, they nevertheless represent an extension of the historic breadth of these duties
and have been rejected by other jurisdictions.65  At a minimum, these doctrines show the great
comfort on the part of Delaware’s judiciary, and great tolerance on the part of its legislature, for
having the courts expand the scope of judge-made law to address novel problems, rather than
waiting for the legislature to act. 
Fourth, the Delaware supreme court has shown a certain degree of discomfort with,
perhaps even hostility to, legislative intrusions in its domain.  There are numerous examples of
this tendency.
• Section 262(h) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) explicitly provides
that, in an appraisal proceeding, the fair value of shares is to be assessed “exclusive of
any element of value arising from any accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”
Yet, in Weinberger v. UOP, the Delaware supreme court read this “to be a very narrow
66 457 A.2d 701, 713 (1983).
67 (emphasis added).
68 535 A.2d 400, 405, n. 3 (1987) (emphasis added).
69 See, e.g., Michelson v. Duncan,  407 A.2d 211, 223 (Del. 1979) (“Section 157 was intended to protect
directors’ business judgment in consideration inuring to the corporation in exchange for creating and issuing stock
options . . . [W]e do not read section 157 as intended to erect a legal barrier to any claim for relief as to an alleged
gift or waste of corporate assets in the issuance of stock options where the claim asserted is one of absolute failure of
consideration.”); see also Zupnick v. Goizueta,  698 A.2d 384 (Del. Ch. 1997).
70 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
71 In other areas and other states, the legislature does act to overturn judge-made law.  See, e.g., 142nd
General Assembly of Delaware, House Bill 309 (overturning Delaware supreme court precedents on searches and
seizures); 140th General Assembly of Delaware, HS 1 (overturning Delaware supreme court precedents on statutes
of limitations); 140th General Assembly of Delaware, HB 249 (overturning Delaware supreme court precedents on
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exception to the appraisal process designed to eliminate pro forma data and projections of
a speculative variety.”66 
• Section 144(a)(1) and (2) of the DGCL provides that a self-dealing transaction shall not
be voidable solely for this reason if it is approved, after full disclosure by “a majority of
the disinterested directors [or] in good faith by vote of the shareholders.”67  Yet, in
Marciano v. Nakash, the Delaware supreme court read this to require “approval by fully
informed disinterested directors under section 144(a)(1), or disinterested stockholders
under section 144(a)(2),” in order to insulate a self-dealing transaction from attack.68 
• Section 157(b) of the DGCL (rights and options respecting stock) provides that “[i]n the
absence of actual fraud in the transaction, the judgment of the directors as to the
consideration for the issuance of such rights or options and the sufficiency thereof shall
be conclusive.” Yet, in numerous compensation cases, the Delaware supreme court read
this to permit review of grants of options (even to non-directors) under a waste standard,
not just the statutorily decreed “actual fraud” standard.69  
• Section 251(c) of the DGCL was amended in 1998 to permit a merger agreement to
expressly stipulate that it must “be submitted to the stockholders whether or not the board
of directors determines at any time subsequent to declaring its advisability that the
agreement is no longer advisable and recommends that the stockholders reject it.” Yet,
just last year, the Delaware supreme court in NCS v. Omnicare70 held that this very
stipulation constituted a per se breach of fiduciary duty by the board because a
controlling shareholder concurrently agreed to vote in favor of the merger.
Fifth,  in Delaware, legislative overturning of judge-made corporate law is practically
unheard of.71  In the modern era, there has been only one significant instance of such
insurance law); Eric Robinson, John C. Coates IV & Mitchell S. Presser, State Takeover Statutes: A Fifty-State
Survey (1989)  (noting that Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, New Jersey, New York, and Virginia passed statutes
overturning court decisions that had invalidated poison pill plans).
72 488 A2d 858 (1985).
73 William T. Allen & Reinier Kraakman, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION  (2003) at 254.
74 Daniel Fischel, The Business Judgement Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455
(1985).
75 Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L. J. 1155
(1990)
76 See Securities Exchange Act, Section 20A(a) (establishing private right of action based on
contemporaneous trading) overturning Moss v. Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1983) (no private right of
action where violation is premised on misappropriation theory); Securities Exchange Act, Section 20(d) (extending
insider trading prohibition to derivatives where trading in underlying security is not permitted) overturning
Laventhall v. General Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 846 (holding that insider
owes no duty to abstain from trading to optionholder); Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b5-1 (establishing
“possession” test for insider trading) overturning U.S. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1066-69 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting
“use” test); Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2 (establishing presumptive duty of trust and confidence among
family members) overturning U.S. v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that family members of insiders
owe no duty to family, corporation, or shareholders that obligates them to abstain from trading); Securities Exchange
Act Rule 14e-3 (prohibiting trading based on information related to tender offer received directly or indirectly from
bidder) overturning effect of Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that employee of printer working for
bidder had no relation with target shareholders that obligated employee to abstain from trading)
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overturning, and this instance represents the classic exception that proves the rule.  In 1985, the
Delaware supreme court, in Smith v. Van Gorkom,72 greatly expanded the risk that directors
would be held liable for breaches of their duty of care.  The decision, described by leading
commentators as “shocking”,73 “one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law”74 and
the like, led to the enactment of Section 102(b)(7).  By permitting a company to opt-out of
personal liability for non-intentional breaches of the duty of care, Section 102(b)(7) took the
sting out of the Van Gorkom decision. The enactment of Section 102(b)(7) was widely supported
by members of the bar, Delaware was quickly followed by numerous states that enacted similar
provisions, and charter amendments availing themselves of the opportunity to opt-out enjoy wide
shareholder support.75  But for this egregious instance, we are not aware of any significant
corporate law decision in Delaware that has been legislatively overruled.  By contrast, in the
comparatively narrow field of insider trading, at least five decisions by the United States
Supreme Court or federal circuit courts have been overturned by Congress or the Securities and
Exchange Commission.76 
B. The Quasi- Deterministic Style of Delaware’s Judge-Made Law.
77 See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009 (1997); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM.
L. REV. 1908 (1998); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1205. 1233-40 (2001).
78 Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Debate
on State Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L. J. 553, 603 (2002) (arguing that indeterminacy helps
Delaware fend-off federal intervention).  Bebchuk and Hamdani view indeterminacy as helping Delaware hide the
extent to which its law favors managers and the extent to which it changes the law to respond to the fear of federal
intervention.  By contrast, we view indeterminacy as reinforcing the technocratic gloss of judge-made law.
79 A Lexis search in the Delaware Supreme Court database using the search term “overrule” has revealed no
instance in the last 20 years where the supreme court overruled its own corporate law precedent.  It did reveal,
however, 10 decisions in other areas where the supreme court overruled its own precedent. See, e.g., Public Water
Supply v. DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378 (Del. 1999) (overruling 1994 decision on judicial review of administrative
agencies).  
80 Compare, e.g.., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (noting that directors may
consider “the impact [of a takeover bid] on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally)” in resisting a bid) with Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (faulting directors for taking account adverse impact of bid on noteholders, whose
rights “were fixed by contract” and therefore “required no further protection” and explaining that board may
consider other constituencies only if “there are rationally related benefits accruing to stockholders.”); In re Tri-Star
Pictures, Inc., Litig. 634, A.2d 319, 333 (Del. 1993) (“In Delaware existing law and policy have evolved into a
virtual per se rule of damages for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure.") with Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 141 (Del. 1997) (“Tri-Star stands only for the narrow proposition that, where directors
have breached their disclosure duties in a corporate transaction that has in turn caused impairment to the economic or
voting rights of stockholders, there must at least be an award of nominal damages.”).
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Beyond the breadth of judge-made law, the mode of judge-made law is noteworthy.  As
several commentators have recently emphasized, judge-made Delaware law eschews hard rules
in favor of flexible and highly fact-intensive standards.77 This results in an extraordinarily high
degree of flexibility.  A typical Delaware opinion reads as if the specific facts, combined with
long-standing and universally accepted fiduciary principles, clearly dictate the outcome of the
case. This permits Delaware law to respond to new problems or to revise the way it is dealing
with old problems without openly admitting that the judges made new law or changed old law.78  
Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court rarely overrules its own precedents.79  Instead, it
tends to justify a ruling that is in tension with precedent (of which there have been a fair share)
by explaining that general-sounding rules announced in earlier cases apply only to a much
narrower set of circumstances80 or attributing any misunderstanding by lawyers or lower court
81 Compare, e.g.., Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (in freezeout merger, plaintiff’s
“monetary remedy ordinarily should be confined to ... appraisal”) with Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.,
498 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Del. 1985) (reversing chancery court applying that principle and faulting it for adopting
“narrow interpretation of Weinberger [that] would render meaningless our extensive discussion of fair dealing found
in that opinion”); Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (noting holding by chancery
court that Time-Warner merger agreement did not result in change of control because control remained in fluid
aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders, but explicitly premising its holding that no change of control occurred on
different ground, i.e. the absence of a break-up) with Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Networks Inc., 637
A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (endorsing rationale offered by the chancery court in Time and noting that defendants “misread”
earlier cases and “totally ignore” portions of their language); see also Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994)
(resolving conflict in chancery court as to effect of approval by special committee by noting that “definitive answer”
can be found in earlier supreme court opinions); Mills Acquisition v. Macmillan Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del.
1988) (“Following Revlon, there appeared to be a degree of "scholarly" debate about the particular fiduciary duty
that had been breached in that case, i.e. the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. In Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345, we
made it abundantly clear that both duties were involved in Revlon, and that both had been breached.” (emphasis
added)).
82 David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127, 132 (1997)
(noting low rate of dissents, in absolute terms and compared to other states).
83 See generally Rock, supra note 77.
84 559 A.2d at 1279 (describing board of Macmillan as “torpid, if not supine”); 498 A.2d at 1106 (noting
that special board committee of Hunt directors engaged in a “quick surrender” when faced with a squeeze-out offer
by Hunt’s controlling shareholder); 637 A.2d at 48 (stating that directors of Paramount “remained prisoners of their
own misconceptions”); Kahn v. Tremont, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (noting that disinterested directors “abdicated
their responsibility” and “default[ed] on their obligation to remain fully informed”); Rock, supra note 77  (detailing
other instances in which Delaware courts castigated actions by directors).
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judges to their failure to read supreme court precedent carefully.81  Similarly, supreme court
judges in Delaware rarely dissent.82 
Consistent with the presentation of Delaware law as a body of stable, clear,
uncontroversial and easy-to-follow standards laid down in a body of prior precedent, the court
reacts harshly when directors’ actions fail to measure up.  In such instances,  judicial opinions
often highlight these failures in preachy, moralistic terms.83  Deficiencies in the conduct of
directors – whether because of ill-will, lack of backbone, or at the least incompetence – are
presented as constituting a failure for which punishment is warranted (and not, say, to a
reasonable, good-faith interpretation of what prior judicial decisions require), and directors are
regularly pilloried for such failures by Delaware’s supreme court.84
C. The Making of Delaware’s Statutory Law
Although formally adopted by the legislature, Delaware’s elected representatives have no
significant role in the crafting of Delaware’s statutory corporate law.  It is the Council of the
85 The Delaware Senate has 26 committees, the House has 28 committees. See
www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature.nsf/?Opendatabase.
86 This is not the uniform mode for legislation in Delaware.  In other areas, bills are amended in the
legislative process, pass with dissent, or are defeated.  See, e.g., 142nd General Assembly of Delaware, House Bill
15 (showing several proposed amendments to bill on smoking regulation and eventual defeat in the Senate),
available at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature.nsf/fsLIS?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/LIS/LIS142.NSF/Home?Open
form; 142nd General Assembly of Delaware, House Bill 24 (showing Senate defeat on bill clarifying crime of
offering false instrument for filing), available at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature.nsf/fsLIS?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/LIS/LIS142.NSF/Home?Open
form; 142nd General Assembly of Delaware, House Bill 182 (showing divided committee report on and several
amendments to bill medical malpractice), available at
http://www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature.nsf/fsLIS?openframeset&Frame=Main&Src=/LIS/LIS142.NSF/Home?Open
form.  Nor is this the uniform mode for corporate law legislation in states other than Delaware. See Kahan & Kamar,
supra note 28, at 732 (describing significant political controversy over section of New York law imposing personal
liability on large shareholders for wage claims); Andrew Ross Sorkin, Michigan Senate Approves Change in
Takeover Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19, 2003, at C4 (noting that bill protecting Taubman family to block a takeover of
its shopping mall company by Simon Property Group was passed by 24-14 after amendment to bill that would have
enabled bidder to continue takeover effort was defeated 19-19).
87 Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L.
885 (1990).
88 Id. at 914.
89 Id. 914 - 915.
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Corporation Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association, rather than a legislative committee,85
that prepares drafts of proposed amendments to the General Corporation Law.  These proposals
are often instigated by lawyers who have encountered an ambiguity or a technical problem in the
statute that they want to have clarified or corrected.  After the Corporate Law Section has
developed a proposal, it is submitted to the legislature.  Delaware’s legislature then typically
adopts the proposed amendments.  Neither a legislative committee nor the legislature as a body
changes the proposal or debates its merits and the vote on the proposed amendment tends to be
unanimous.86   Legislators claim no expertise over corporate law and partisan politics play no
role in its formation.87 
Even within the Delaware bar, proposed amendments hardly ever generate controversy.88 
One reason is that the Corporate Law Section endeavors to make the necessary compromises to
reach a consensus. For example, a significant amount of bargaining took place on the Council
over the precise scope of Section 102(b)(7) in order to generate an unanimous proposal for the
legislature to act upon.89 
The ultimate reason for the lack of controversy over statutory amendments, however, is
that, although Delaware regularly revises its corporate law, most amendments address minor or
technical issues.  Consider, for example, the 1999 amendments to the DGCL which made
90 1999 Delaware Laws Ch. 123 (S.B. 137).
91 Section 170 (dividends) was changed to clarify that nonstock corporations can declare dividends whether
they for pro profit or not for profit.  Section 242 (charter amendment) was modified to eliminate the requirement of
two meetings by the governing body of a nonstock corporation to adopt a charter amendment. Section 255 (merger
of nonstock corporations) lowers the approval threshold from two-thirds to a majority of members, thus conforming
to the threshold for stock corporations. 
92 A new sections 266 permits a conversion by a corporation, a new section 265 permits a conversion into a
corporation, and amendments to section 391 provide for fees for these conversions.  
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changes to ten sections.90 Six of the changes concern only nonstock corporations91 or deal with
the conversion of a corporations into a domestic LLC, a limited partnership, or a business trust
(with unanimous shareholder approval), and vice versa.92 The remaining four amendments
address the following: 
• Section 102(a) (name of corporations) was changed to provide that punctuation in terms
such as “Ltd.” was optional and that foreign terms designating corporate existence are acceptable
as part of the name.  
• Section 202 (transfer restrictions) was changed to clarify that restrictions may the
placed on the amount of stock owned by any person, that a restriction may obligate a holder to
sell restricted securities or provide for an automatic sale, and that restrictions imposed to qualify
as a REIT are presumed to be reasonable.  
• Section 251(g) (mergers with wholly-owned subsidiaries to create a holding company)
was changed to clarify that the directors of the surviving company may be changed without vote
by the shareholders of the holding company.  
• Section 253 (short-form merger) was changed to clarify that the 90% ownership
prerequisite for short-form mergers applies only to classes of outstanding shares that would, but
for that section, be entitled to vote on the merger.
Thus, none of the 1999 amendments relate to corporate governance, fiduciary duties, or other
core issues of corporate law and none could even remotely be anticipated to generate public
debate or controversy.  Although statutory amendments occasionally venture somewhat further
93 For example, in a 1998 amendment, Section 251(c) was changed so that the merger agreement could
require that the agreement be submitted to the stockholders whether or not the board of directors determines at any
time subsequent to declaring its advisability that the agreement is no longer advisable and recommends that the
stockholders reject it. See 1998 Delaware Laws Ch. 339 (S.B. 311).  Of course, under federal law and Delaware
fiduciary duty law, the directors would have to inform shareholders of their revised views and of the basis for these
views.  Moreover, the Delaware supreme court has held that directors violate their fiduciary duties by including such
a requirement in the merger agreement when shareholders lack the effective ability to block the merger in the
shareholder vote.  See NCS, 818 A.2d at 914.  This holding greatly limits the practical significance of the
amendment.
94 By contrast, laws in other states address more substantive issues.  See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 59,
at 1857 - 1866 (describing severe anti-takeover statutes enacted by several states). 
95 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 28, at 708-715.
96 See also Skeel, supra note 82, at 134 (describing judicial appointment process as apolitical).
97 The Lawyers Almanac J-1 (2002)
98 Del. Const art. IV, §3.
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afield from the technical,93 the 1999 amendments typify Delaware’s legislative changes to its
corporation law.94 
D. Distinctive Features of Delaware’s Judiciary
Delaware’s judiciary, the principal generator and, as discussed below, enforcer of this
distinctive law, is itself peculiar in several respects.  First, as noted above, Delaware is the only
state that has a specialized corporate trial court, the court of chancery, which decides cases
without juries.95  Usually, several of the five supreme courts judges (at present, three) are former
members of the chancery court.  Thus, both on the trial and the appeals court level, corporate
cases are decided by a specialized judiciary.  
Second, compared both to judges in other states and to federal judges, Delaware’s
judiciary is non-politicized.96  Delaware is one of only eight states where judges are selected
based on merit by a nominating commissions and face no elections.97  In addition, Delaware’s
constitution mandates a partisan balance in the supreme court and the overall judiciary.98  
To be sure, unlike federal judges, Delaware judges serve a limited term.  But just as
initial appointment decisions, reappointment decisions are non-politicized.  The only modern
instance where a Delaware chancery or supreme court judge who wanted to get reappointed
failed to be involves Justice Andrew Moore. The reason for this failure, however, is unrelated to
his politics or his jurisprudence.  Rather, Justice Moore, while praised for his intellectual
99 See Karen Donovan, Shareholders’ Advocates Protest Justice’s Removal, NATL. L. J., June 6, 1994, at
B1; see also John Close, Justice Denied in Delaware, AMER. LAW., July/Aug. 1994, at 23 (noting that Justice
Moore, the author of a string of seminal opinions, was prone to hand out “harsh chastisement of attorneys”,
“projected a sense of arrogance” and engaged in “ad hominem” questioning during oral argument).
100  The following is an incomplete list of such writings by current (and very recently retired) members of
the Delaware supreme court and chancery court:  William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr , The Great
Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067 (2002); William T.
Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware
Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U.L. REV. 449
(2002);  William B. Chandler III and Leo E. Strine, Jr.,  The New Federalism of the American Corporate
Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003); 
William B. Chandler III, On the Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1083 (1999);  Randy J. Holland , State Jury Trials and Federalism: Constitutionalizing Common Law
Concepts, 38 VAL. U.L. REV. 373 (2004);  Randy J. Holland & David A. Skeel, Jr., Deciding Cases without
Controversy, 5 DEL. L. REV. 115 (2002); Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Discipline: Independence with
Accountability, 5 WID. L. SYMP. J. 117 (2000); Randy J. Holland , State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69
TEMPLE L. REV. 989 (1996); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Inescapably Empirical Foundations of the Common Law of
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002);  Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors
and Stockholders in Change of Control Transactions:  Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169
(2002); Leo Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a
Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1257 (2001);  E. Norman Veasey, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers:
Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2003);  E. Norman Veasey, Robert S. Marx Lecture: Corporate Governance and Ethics in
a Post Enron/Worldcom Environment, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 731 (2003);   E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in
Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. 441 (2003);  E.
Norman Veasey, Views from the Bench: Musings on the Dynamics of Corporate Governance Issues, Director
Liability Concerns, Corporate Control Transactions, Ethics and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (2003);  E.
Norman Veasey, Policy and Legal Overview of Best Corporate Governance Principles, 56 SMU L. REV. 2135
(2003);  E. Norman Veasey, Ethics 2000: Thoughts and Comments on Key Issues of Professional Responsibility in
the Twenty-First Century, 5 DEL. L. REV. 1 (2002);  E. Norman Veasey, The Ethical and Professional
Responsibilities of the Lawyer for the Corporation in Responding to Fraudulent Conduct by Corporate Officers or
Agents, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2002);  E. Norman Veasey, Law and Fact in Judicial Review of Corporate
Transactions, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2002);  E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations
for Good Corporate Governance Practices -- or Vice Versa? , 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179 (2001);  E. Norman Veasey,
The Roles of the Delaware Courts in Merger and Acquisition Litigation, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2001); E. Norman
Veasey, The Many Facets of Judicial Independence Diamond, 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 779 (2001);  E. Norman
Veasey; An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decision-making in Corporate Law, 1 DEL. L. REV. 169 (1998).
101 Interestingly, while the Delaware Chancery Court does not keep track systematically of chancellors’
speeches or public appearances, the SEC provides a website with links to speeches and public statements of
commissioners and staff.  See http://www.sec.gov/news/speech.shtml.  
-23-
prowess, is said to have lost favor among the corporate bar because he was perceived as
“arrogant, acerbic,  sanctimonious and upbraiding.”99 
Finally, to a greater extent than is typical for members of the judiciary, Delaware judges
propagate their vision outside the court room. Delaware judges publish an extraordinary amount
of extra-judicial writing.100  Members of Delaware’s judiciary are also regular participants in
professional meetings, attend academic conferences, and give lectures to corporate directors.101
102  Indeed, the brochure promises benefits including the opportunity to “learn from and interact with
members of the Delaware Supreme Court and Court of Chancery.”  Brochure, Sixteenth Annual Corporate Law
Institute (available on line at: http://www.law.tulane.edu/cdo/inst/2004CorpLawInst.pdf).
103 DGCL, §124(3), 284
104 In a search in Westlaw’s Delaware Business Organization Case Law file, we found 3 cases involving
charitable corporations in which the Attorney General took some action. Otherwise, the Attorney General appeared
in corporate disputes only as defendant in cases challenging the constitutionality of Delaware’s anti-takeover law.
105 Kahan & Kamar, supra note 28, at 708.
106 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (holding that Delaware’s quasi-in-rem statute was not a valid
basis for its exercise of jurisdiction over directors of Delaware corporations). 
107 See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 28, at n. 117.  
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Thus, for example, Delaware judges regularly appear at the annual Tulane Corporate Law
Institute: at the 2004 conference, Justices Veasey, Steele and Jacobs from the Delaware supreme
court and Vice-Chancellor Strine from the chancery court were all present.102  
E. The Reliance on Private Enforcement
Another notable trait of Delaware’s corporate law is that it is enforced exclusively
through private lawsuits.  Delaware has no regulatory agency that enforces its corporate law; the
state does not enforce corporate norms through criminal proceedings; and even though the
Attorney General has some civil enforcement powers with respect to for-profit corporations,103
these powers are virtually never exercised.104  
In striking contrast to this lack of public enforcement, Delaware has taken great care in
developing a first-rate system for private enforcement.  It is the only state in the nation that has a
specialized corporate court, the court of chancery.  The chancery court is well-funded, enjoys
wide respect, resolves disputes speedily, and probably accounts for the fact that Delaware’s
overall court system is ranked first among all states.105  If needed, appeals from the chancery
court are heard by the Delaware supreme court quickly and decided instantaneously after oral
argument.  Moreover, Delaware is at pains to assure that the chancery court has the personal
jurisdiction that it needs in order to resolve the corporate disputes involving Delaware
corporations.  Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court106 invalidated the statutory basis for
Delaware’s personal jurisdiction as inconsistent with due process, thereby threatening the ability
of the chancery court to resolve corporate disputes, Delaware passed a new statute within 13
days establishing a different statutory basis for its jurisdiction over corporate directors.107  More
recently, in light of the trend by public corporations to have only few officers serve on its board
of directors, Delaware expanded its personal jurisdiction statute to include a corporation’s senior
108 See SEC. REG. & L. RPTR., Aug. 11, 2003, at 1331, 1333.
109 For example, several sections of the German Aktienrecht and U.K. company law  imposes criminal
penalties and fines for misconduct. See, e.g., Aktienrecht, §399 (false statements), §404 (violation of duty of
confidentiality); Company Act 1985, §342 (criminalizing the extension of  loans to directors in violation of
Company Act).  For a particularly high profile and dramatic example, see the current criminal prosecution of Josef
Ackermann, CEO of Deutsche Bank, over his approval as a director of Mannesmann of a bonus to Mannesmann’s
CEO at the conclusion of the control battle with Vodafone.  Mark Landler, Banker Faces German Court Over Pay
Issue, NEW YORK TIMES, January 20, 2004 at C1; Marcus Walker, After Huge Merger, German CEO Faces Trial
over Payout, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2003, at A1; see also Santander Chairman Ordered to Stand Trial, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 28. 2004, at C2 (reporting that three executives of Spanish bank were being tried for arranging generous
severance packages for bank’s former executives).
110 See Securities Exchange Act, Sec. 21 (empowering SEC to investigate violations of and enforce
provisions of Securities Exchange Act); Pitt Cites Record Number of Financial Reporting Actions, SEC. REG. & L.
RPTR. 1747 (Oct. 28, 2002) (noting that SEC brought 163 actions for financial reporting and issuer disclosure
violations in fiscal 2002).
111 No state has a corporate court similar to Delaware’s chancery court. Only 12 other states have a consent
statutes relating to directors similar to Delaware’s and, to our knowledge, no other state has a consent statute relating
to officers.  See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 28, at 708-715.
112 See supra note 2.
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or most highly compensated officers, whether or not they are members of the board of
directors.108 
This focus on private enforcement is distinctive both from the international and the
national perspective.  Internationally, corporate law rules are to a large extent publicly enforced. 
Public and quasi-public enforcement agents include the securities regulators of various countries;
stock exchanges; the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers which enforces the U.K. City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers; and prosecutors which, in Continental Europe, bring criminal
proceedings against misbehavior by corporate executives, including actions that would be
regarded in the U.S. as, at most, civil breaches of fiduciary duties.109  Within the United States,
corporate law rules adopted by the stock exchanges or through the federal securities laws are
enforced publicly either on an exclusive basis or concurrent with private enforcement.110  
To be sure, other states are not necessarily more active than Delaware is to enforce
corporate laws publicly.  But none of the other states has any significant stake in its corporate
law and none of the other states has developed sophisticated structures for the private
enforcement of its corporate laws equivalent to Delaware’s.111  Moreover, at least some states
other than Delaware publicly prosecute corporate misconduct.  Recently, for example, Dennis
Kozlowski, the CEO, and two other officers of  Tyco International, were charged with grand
larceny and violations of the general business law by the Manhattan District Attorney for looting
the company through excessive compensation or taking unauthorized loans – classic self-dealing
transaction by a corporate fiduciary.112 And, with a federal investigation pending, Oklahoma’s
Attorney General filed criminal charges against former WorldCom CEO Ebbers and five others
113 Oklahoma Files First Criminal Charges Against WordCom, THE INDEPENDENT, Aug. 23, 2003; see also
Former Qwest Charman Anschutz to Pay $4.4M in N.Y. State Spinning Case, SEC. REG. & L. 857 (May 19, 2003)
(noting settlement by corporate executive of charges brought by N.Y. Attorney General has he received profitable
allocations of IPO shares by Salomon Smith Barney as an inducement or reward for investment banking business
from the company). .
114 Company Act 1983, Sec. 33.
115 Id., sec. 348 - 351.
116 Id., sec. 190 - 195. 
117 Id., sec. 395 - 408.
118 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 'Inaccurate' Stock Prices, 1992 DUKE L. J.
977 (1992).  Federal disclosure rules also apply to a company that seeks to issue shares.  Delaware has no equivalent
rules, presumably due to the fact that a sale of shares is outside the internal affairs of a company.
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for defrauding the state’s pension funds and other investors.113  Thus, even relative to other U.S.
states, Delaware’s focus on private enforcement stands out.
F. The Scope of Corporate Law
The scope of Delaware’s corporate law includes the regulation of the internal affairs of
the corporation and concerns the powers, rights and duties of the corporation, its shareholders,
officers and directors.  Matters outside the internal affairs are largely not addressed by
Delaware’s corporate law.  Although the scope of Delaware’s law in this respect is similar to the
scope of corporate law in other states in the U.S., it differs from the cope of corporate law in
other countries.  U.K. company law, for example, contains prohibitions on carrying out a
business under a misleading name,114 imposes a duty on a corporation to identify its name and
characteristics in dealing with outsiders,115 regulates debentures,116 and deals with security
interests.117  In the U.S., these issues are addressed by different bodies of state or federal law.
Within the confines of internal affairs, Delaware corporate law broadly covers most
areas.  Rules of Delaware corporate law thus govern: the creation and dissolution of a
corporation; the powers of the corporation; the decision-making powers of shareholders,
directors, and officers; shareholder voting; and the obligations of corporate fiduciaries.  In
general terms, Delaware corporate law (though not necessarily the laws of other U.S.. states) also
covers much of the same territory as the federal securities laws, though it does so in a rather
different manner.  Federal law, for example, requires public companies to disclose a wide set of
information, on a regular basis or in relation to a vote.118 Delaware law also governs the
company’s disclosure of information.  But rather than imposing specific disclosure requirements,
Delaware law requires a company to disclose all material information when shareholders are
119 See also Erickson  v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular LLC (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2003) (holding that
disclosure statement in short-form merger did not comply with requirement to disclose all material information
related to the merger to permit shareholders to make informed decision on whether to exercise their appraisal rights).
120 DGCL, §220.
121 Kahn v. Lynch, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) .
122 Securities Exchange Act, Section 14(d).
123  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) .
124 Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
125 See Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241 (1949); Guttman v. Huang, 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48,
*36 (“Delaware law has long held ... that directors who misuse corporate information to profit at the expense of
innocent buyers of their stock should disgorge their profit.”).  As of late, Delaware seems to have become an easier
venue for plaintiffs to pursue insider trading clams than the federal courts. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del.Ch. 2003)  (refusing to dismiss derivative insider trading claim upon recommendation
of special litigation committee where similar direct claims under federal law have been dismissed for failure to meet
PSLRA pleading requirements).
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asked to vote or to take other actions119 and grants shareholders a general right to inspect the
company’s books and records for a proper purpose.120  Federal law, including stock exchange
rules sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission, require the board of directors of
public corporations, including certain committees, to contain specified percentages of
independent directors.  Delaware law also governs board composition.  But rather than the stick
of mandated requirements, Delaware law uses the carrot of granting properly constituted boards
greater legal protections.121  Federal law prohibits certain forms of coercion and discrimination in
tender offers.122  Delaware law subjects coercion and discrimination by the corporation to legal
scrutiny for breach of fiduciary duties and permits a board wide latitude in defending itself
against a coercive offers by a third party.123  Federal law criminalizes insider trading and creates
a private right of action on behalf of investors.124  Delaware law create a right of action on the
part of the company, enforceable through a derivative suit by shareholders.125
These differences in approach between Delaware and federal law, of course, are related
to the distinctive traits of Delaware law.  As noted before, much of Delaware law is judge-made
and privately enforced.  But the development of specific disclosure requirement, of mandated
rules of board composition, of criminal violations, and even of inflexible per se rules on coercion
and discrimination is hard to mesh with traditional modes of judge-made law, and specifically
with the modes of privately enforced, judge-made corporate law in Delaware. Because of the
distinctive traits of Delaware law, its regulation of disclosure, board composition, coercive
tender offers, and insider trading, though striking in the same direction, takes a form different
from federal law.
III. Delaware’s Traits as Adaptations to the Political Landscape
126 See generally Kahan & Kamar, supra note 28.
127 See Roe, supra note 3 (noting that Delaware’s chief competitive pressure comes not from other states,
but from the  federal government); Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 78  (same).
128 See, e.g., the Court of Chancery’s Home Page, http://courts.state.de.us/chancery/index.htm.  See, also,
The Delaware Supreme Court Golden Anniversary (Randy Holland & Helen Winslow, eds.)(2001).
129  Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
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The various traits of Delaware corporate law discussed in the last Part should all be
viewed through the lens of the institutional and political landscape in which Delaware must
operate.  Delaware operates in a federal system in which its regulatory powers co-exist and can
be constrained by the powers of the federal government and the various other states.  In this
system, Delaware is faced with an omnipresent, albeit not imminent, specter of a federal
takeover.  Such a takeover could make Delaware corporate law irrelevant, or at least greatly
diminish the price companies are willing to pay to incorporate in Delaware, and thus eradicate
the huge profits Delaware derives from being the domicile of choice for publicly-traded U.S.
corporations.  Indeed, given the historic failure of states to take significant measures to compete
with Delaware for incorporations,126 the possibility of federal preemption of state corporate law
due to populist pressure probably constitutes the single most important threat to Delaware’s
profits from the franchising business.127  Moreover, embedded in this federal system are rules on
personal jurisdiction and on conflicts of laws which constrain Delaware’s ability to regulate
certain types of corporate conduct effectively. In this Part, we try to explain the traits of
Delaware corporate law as modes of adaptation to this landscape.
A. Embracing Common Law Classicism: The Creative Use of Anachronism?
There is something determinedly old-fashioned about Delaware corporate law.  The most
superficial feature is the pomp and ceremony, the celebration of old distinctions like that
between law and equity, the attention to tradition.128  But it goes much deeper.  Delaware
corporate law may be the last vestige of the old 19th century common law style in America.  
The traits of Delaware corporate law described above are striking in part because they
represent a rather pure, and therefore rather unfamiliar, form of the common law system.  It is
worth pausing for a moment to appreciate just how much of a throwback Delaware is.  The
relationship between the Delaware judiciary and legislature is an example of the traditional
relationship between a common law judiciary and the legislature, and illustrates one of the
traditional differences between a common law and code jurisdiction.  The dominance of the
judiciary in making law, and the judiciary’s stubborn insistence on its primacy in relation to
legislation, was already described, explored and ultimately decried by Roscoe Pound in his
classic 1908 article Common Law & Legislation.129  Pound famously attacked the attitude that
lay behind the 19th century American common law judicial precept that “statutes in derogation of
the common law shall be narrowly construed.”  Similarly, in thinking about Delaware through
130 See supra Section I.A..
131  See, e.g., Jerome Frank, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 32-41 (1935).
132  See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1708-09, 1754-62 (1976).
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Hart & Sacks’s conceptual framework, one is struck by the extent to which Delaware corporate
law reflects a pre-New Deal understanding: no administrative agencies; private enforcement;
incremental legislation from an otherwise largely passive legislature.  And although never
explicitly stated, the precept that “statutes in derogation of judge-made law shall be narrowly
construed” offers a good guide to Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence.130
And yet we (including the Delaware judges and lawyers) are all moderns.  We all know
that we live in the post-New Deal Administrative State.  We have all learned the lessons that the
Legal Realist taught,131 and that Critical Legal Studies reemphasized:132 that law has an
unavoidable political and moral aspect; that legal answers are created not discovered; that the
law’s affectation of technocratic expertise and neutrality is often a cover for political and
normative choices.  We therefore cannot assume that Delaware’s embrace of the 19th century
style is simply a naive (mis)understanding of the nature of law.  
What, then, could be behind this seemingly disingenuous affectation?  We argue that this
old common law vision, with its distinctive judicial virtues, is adaptive given Delaware’s
vulnerable position in the corporate law-making hierarchy.  Just as the old common law style has
been explained as a way that politically weak judges preserve their autonomy (or, less charitably,
grab political power), so too that style can serve to aid a politically weak state in preserving its
law making autonomy within a larger political landscape. By aligning itself with this history,
Delaware gains legitimacy. 
B. Preserving the Technocratic and Apolitical Gloss
Several of the traits described above have the effect of creating and enhancing a
technocratic, apolitical gloss of Delaware law.  The public perception of Delaware’s corporate
law as technocratic and apolitical is important for Delaware as it helps fend off federal
intervention.  As explained in Part I, Delaware has a legitimacy problem: why should a little
state make the national rules of corporate law?  By constructing its law as technocratic and
apolitical, Delaware deflects attention from the democratic deficit of its corporate law,
legitimizes its role as promulgator of the de facto national law, and reduces the likelihood of a
populist challenge to its pre-eminence.
Several traits of Delaware law contribute to this technocratic and apolitical gloss. 
Consider first the breadth of judge-made corporate law. Judge-made law tends to have more of a
133 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 78, at  604  (noting that reliance on judge-made, rather than
legislative, law reduces Delaware’s legitimacy problem).
134 Even though many modern legal scholars and practitioners are aware that judicial reasoning is often just
a veneer that masks important and controversial decisions of a political nature, the relevant political sphere here is
not legal scholars and practitioners, but the general public, which is much less aware or comfortable with judges
making political choices. 
135 See, e.g., Michael Slackman & Marc Santora, Spitzer, Sounding Gubernatorial, Discusses the State of
the State, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, B1 (“Since his election as attorney general, Mr. Spitzer has worked quietly
and efficiently to position himself for a run for governor, taking on issues -- like Wall Street corruption -- that have
given him a national spotlight while also working to build grassroots support across the state.”);  Michael Lewis, In
Defense of the Boom, N. Y. TIMES (MAGAZINE), October 27, 2002 at 44 (“The recent wave of outrage about Wall
Street's behavior began, you may recall, when New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer deployed an obscure
state law to shoehorn out of Merrill Lynch every e-mail message Merrill employees had ever sent relating to the
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neutral, apolitical aura than statutory law.133  Judges are more removed from the political process
and professional norms require judges to give reasoned opinions based on precedent, rather than
simply doing what they think is the right thing politically.  In judicial reasoning in general, and
Delaware’s corporate law jurisprudence in particular, partisan conflicts are not openly discussed,
monetary contributions are supposed to play no role, lobbying takes the form of technical legal
briefs, and political choices are swept under the carpet.   
To the extent that corporate law rules are judge-made, the fact that it is Delaware judges
rather than federal judges who make the rules does not much detract from the legitimacy of these
rules. Judges lack obvious democratic legitimacy in any event.  Rather, judicial decisions and
judge-made law can be thought to derive legitimacy in the public eye134 from neutral, non-
partisan, and technical “legal” reasoning.  In other words, in the public perception, federal and
Delaware judges are largely interchangeable, or least much more so than federal and Delaware
legislators would be. Indeed, since Delaware’s judiciary is less politicized and has greater claims
to expertise in corporate law than the federal one, its rulings may enjoy greater legitimacy than
those of federal judges would.
The style of Delaware’s judge-made law further enhances the notion that the law is
technocratic and apolitical.  Delaware’s supreme court eschews overruling its own precedent and
dissenting opinions.  Instead, Delaware supreme court opinions adopt a quasi-deterministic
reasoning according to which any disagreements with the chancery court or corporate actors are
due to faulty legal reasoning or moral shortcomings by others.  This serves to gloss over the fact
that reasonable minds may differ on how an issue ought to be resolved and that the outcome of
disputes depends not just on the decision maker's technical skills but on her policy preferences.
The lack of public enforcement further reduces the state’s visible role in the
administration of its corporate law.  Rather than two state bodies (one that brings actions and
another the resolves disputes), only one body – the courts – is involved.  Delaware thus has no
room for (over)eager, or overly lax, and possibly politically motivated law enforcers in the vein
of Eliot Spitzer,135 Rudy Giuliani,136 or Harvey Pitt.137  Delaware, of course, does have courts and
Internet boom. It was easy to see why Spitzer chose Merrill Lynch as his target. He has political ambitions (he wants
to be governor of New York, at least), and unlike Goldman, Sachs or Morgan Stanley or one of the other big
investment banks more central to the Internet bubble, Merrill actually serviced lots of small customers. It's a firm
that voters can relate to.”).
136 See, e.g., Catharine S. Manegold, A Road of Many Turns, an End Triumphant: Rudolph William
Giuliani,  N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1993 at  B3 (“Campaigning for mayor, Mr. Giuliani always said his quest was a
natural progression in a career that took him from the Federal prosecutor's office in Manhattan to the No. 3 official in
the Reagan Justice Department and finally United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. . . . He
became famous for his prosecution of organized crime figures and insider trading. The names Milken, Boesky and
Drexel-Burnham Lambert were linked with his after he led a series of assaults against Wall Street's excesses.”).
137 Harvey Pitt, who had been hailed on his appointment as chair of the SEC, was ultimately forced to resign
in the wake of accusations of laxity in response to the corporate and accounting scandals.  Stephen Labaton, Praise
to Scorn: Mercurial Ride Of S.E.C. Chief, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at 1 (article includes discussion of Pitt’s
“decision to press the enforcement staff to file a securities fraud lawsuit against WorldCom only a day after it
disclosed its problems.”).
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judges.  But judges are brought to the fore through the decentralized activities of private actors
rather than on their own motion, lack the power and staff to conduct investigations, and are
supposed to exercise restraint in commenting on disputes. Delaware’s judiciary, in particular, is
highly respected for its technocratic expertise and a model of non-partisanship.  The focus on
enforcement of Delaware corporate law through actions initiated by private parties and resolved
by Delaware courts thus supports the apolitical and technocratic image of the law. 
The extra-cameral activities by members of the Delaware judiciary also mesh well with
Delaware’s political interests.  These activities help market Delaware law to the legal
community; let judges obtain information about the views of practitioners and academics; and
enable the judiciary to amplify their admonitions to directors to comport with the judiciary’s 
vision of proper corporate governance and thus beef up Delaware’s enforcement regime.  In all
these respects, they make Delaware more attractive as an incorporation haven.  But, from our
perspective, they also serve an additional function: they create an outlet for dissatisfaction with
legal rulings and permit individual members of the judiciary to refine, confine, and maybe even
signal a retreat from the court’s holdings.  The need for this outlet is created by the fact that, as
judges, members of Delaware’s judiciary cannot be directly lobbied; that practicing lawyers may
be reluctant to criticize judicial rulings openly; and that the judiciary lacks control over its
docket and thus may value the opportunity to clarify their holdings before the next case
involving that issue arises.
Even in the matters into which the legislature does intrude, Delaware law has – in this
instance deservedly – a technocratic and apolitical appearance.  Proposed laws are adopted
without amendment or debate, by overwhelming majorities.  Any lobbying that takes place
occurs within the corporate law section of the Delaware bar.  Thus, even within the legislative
process, the dirty portions of politics either do not exist or at least are not visible: Campaign
contributions, partisanship, and even the special interests of local constituents have no apparent
138 Cf. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Michigan Senate Approves Change in Takeover Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 19,
2003, at C4 (noting that intense lobbying effort by Taubman family lead to passage of legislation that would enable
the Taubmans to block hostile bid for its shopping mall empire); Spitzer v. Grasso, WALL ST. J., May 25, 2004 at
A16 (suggesting that Spitzer failed to sue fellow Democrat McCall for political reasons).
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effect on the law and lobbying is channeled through a professional, consensus-oriented body that
meets outside the public’s eye and self-consciously avoids taking on controversial issues. 
This is not to say that Delaware politics are generally more pure than elsewhere or that a
large in-state interest, be it a large local corporations such as DuPont or MBNA or chicken
farmers from the southern part of the state, do not have significant influence in Delaware
politics.  It is not.  But precisely because local Delaware politics is impure, it is imperative for
Delaware to assure, as much as possible, that the corporate lawmaking process is not, or is
perceived not to be, the product of ordinary politicking.  Few things would do more to
undermine Delaware’s legitimacy than, say, a front-page article in a major newspaper discussing
how a large corporation got some controversial legislation passed by channeling substantial
contributions to local politicians.138
C.  The Minimization of Interjurisdictional Conflict
Another way that Delaware adapts to its position in the federal system is to take account
of the rules on personal jurisdiction and conflicts of law to avoid interjurisdictional conflicts.
Under the due process clause of the U.S. constitution, state courts can assert jurisdiction only
over defendants who have the requisite minimum contacts with the forum state.  Under
prevailing rules on conflict of laws, which are part of the law of each state, the law of the state of
incorporation governs the internal affairs of the corporation, but other factors determine the law
applicable to most other disputes.  These jurisdictional and conflict rules help explain the scope
of Delaware’s corporate law.
Consider, for a moment, how narrow Delaware’s corporate law is. It is largely confined
to the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation.  This scope is due neither to some
inherent understanding of what corporate law is about – U.K. company law encompasses a
number of other matters – nor to Delaware not being able to offer a superior substantive product
on other matters – because of its quality courts and its responsiveness, it well could.  Rather, it is
due to conflict of law rules which would generally not point to the law of the state of
incorporation as governing matters outside the internal affairs of the corporation. 
Of course, Delaware could revise its own conflict rules to point to Delaware law as
governing matters outside the company’s internal affairs.  But Delaware could not force other
states to do the same. Thus, depending on whether a dispute is litigated in Delaware or a
different forum, the forum’s conflict rules would point to different bodies of law, with possibly
different substantive content.  As a result, parties would not know which substantive rules apply
before a lawsuit is brought.  Even if Delaware law were substantively superior to the law of other
states, parties may well prefer to know with certainty that they are governed by the (inferior) law
139 Parties can, of course, include forum and law selection clauses in contracts, but many of the areas where
Delaware’s superiority would be most significant, such as products liability, involve tort rather than contract claims.
140 See supra Section II.F.
141 Though having control of a Delaware corporation is not a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction,
individual controlling shareholders will often be directors and corporate controlling shareholders will usually be
under a duty to indemnify their representatives on the board of the controlled company, and thus be subject to the de
jure or de facto jurisdiction of the Delaware courts. Grace Brothers, Ltd. v. Uniholding Corp., 2000 Del. Ch. Lexis
101 (rejecting argument that controlling shareholder is indispensable party and exercising jurisdiction over
individual directors, who held large stake in controlling shareholder, noting that directors can seek indemnification
or contribution from controlling shareholder in a separate action).  Moreover, Delaware employs the far-reaching
conspiracy theory to obtain personal jurisdiction over controlling shareholders.  See, e.g., Parfi Holding AB v.
Mirror Image Internet, 794 A.2d 1211 (Del. Ch. 2001), rev’d on other grounds 817 A.2d 149 (Del. 2002) (basing
jurisdiction on conspiracy theory which requires that controlling shareholder participated in conspiracy and had
reason to know that substantial act or effect in furtherance of conspiracy occurred in forum state); Gibralt Capital
Corp. v. Smith, 2001 Del. Ch. Lexis 60 (same).
142 Such duties do exist under U.S. federal law or U.K. company law. Securities Exchange Act, Sec. 13(d),
14(d); Company Act 1985, sec. 198 - 210A. (tender offer rules).  Curiously, Delaware’s corporation law has a
“reorganization” section which permits companies to insert a clause in their charter that would permit a requisite
majority of creditors (majority in number, 3/4 in value) to approve a compromise or arrangement which, if approved
by the court, be binding on all creditors.  See §102(b)(2).  It is unlikely that the Delaware court have the jurisdiction
over creditors to enforce this section and it does not appear it that it is ever used. See Edward P. Welch & Andrew J.
Turezyn, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATE LAW, at GLC-I-21 (citing no relevant cases in commentary
on section).
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of, say, Maryland, to uncertainty over whether (inferior) Maryland law or (superior) Delaware
law applies.139 
Moreover, Delaware has a lot to lose from challenging the prevailing rules on conflict of
laws.  If Delaware is perceived as being overly aggressive in expanding its own law to areas that
are not traditionally subject to laws of the state of incorporation, other states may respond by
changing their conflict rules to limit the scope of  the internal affairs rule.  The continued
applicability of the internal affairs rule is, of course, the life-blood of Delaware.  Thus, Delaware
has no interest to pursue a major change of the status quo of conflict rules.
Furthermore, Delaware would only have a limited ability to enforce many rules that
would fall outside the internal affairs doctrine.  To enforce its law effectively, Delaware courts
needs personal jurisdiction over the relevant defendants.  Such jurisdiction would be lacking,
say, over a creditor who claims a security interest in the company’s property – an issue regulated
by U.K. company law, but not by Delaware corporation law.140  
Limitations imposed by personal jurisdiction may also affect how Delaware regulates the
internal affairs.  Thus, Delaware law imposes no duties on shareholders (unless they are
controlling shareholders)141 or on a bidder to structure tender offers in a certain manner.142  Such
rules may well complement the governance structure established by Delaware’s corporate law.  
But because being a shareholder of or a bidder for shares of a Delaware corporation would be
143 We can already see some subtle signs that Delaware law will be changing.  For example, in In re Oracle
Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 917 (Del.Ch. 2003), Vice-Chancellor Strine employed an narrow concept of
independence -- one that takes account of the fact that interests that are not directly financial, such as collegiality
among members of the same faculty or charitable donations to a faculty member’s university can impinge on one’s
independence – in refusing to dismiss a complaint upon the recommendation of a special litigation committee.  And
in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del.Ch. 2003), Chancellor Chandler refused to
dismiss a complaint that a senior officer received an overly generous severance package on the grounds that the
alleged lack of board involvement in structuring the severance package may amount to lack of good faith and board
members may thus not be protected by Section 102(b)(7).  In addition, the Delaware judiciary has been out on the
hustings trying to send a message.  See, e.g., Chandler & Strine, supra note 100.
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unlikely to satisfy the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts, Delaware courts would
lack the ability to enforce such duties effectively. 
IV. Implications and Explorations
A. Responding to Crises
Delaware corporate law’s adaptive adherence to the old common law model carries
inherent limitations that can bind uncomfortably when crises arise.  In this regard, contrast the
different responses to the post-Enron sense that “something must be done.”  Congress held
hearings and ultimately enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  The Securities and Exchange
Commission, on its own accord and in response to Congressional dictate, adopted new
regulations and leaned on the stock exchanges to reform their corporate governance standards for
listed companies.  Several states have passed news laws or instituted criminal proceedings
against executives involved in the scandals.
Compare this to Delaware.  Its legislature did not act – it did not hold any hearings and
did not pass any legislation – because it eschews controversy.  No administrative agency
promulgated new rules because Delaware has no parallel to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.  No public prosecutor went on the warpath against corporate wrong-doers because
Delaware corporate law is enforced by private actions.  Given Delaware’s traditional mode of
addressing controversy, it had to wait until a legal dispute was brought in its courts.  But even in
this regard, Delaware had no opportunity to address the recent scandals directly. In short,
Delaware has been out of the limelight.
This does not mean, however, than Delaware has been out of the loop.  It is much too
early to tell what effect the recent scandals will have on Delaware law.   We will not know until,
several years hence, we look back and trace out the various ways in which the lessons of Enron,
etc. – whatever they turn out to be – are, incrementally and slowly, incorporated and expressed
in Delaware judicial review of board conduct.143
Some may lament that Delaware is being slow to respond. But that is to miss a very
important point: Delaware’s slowness is part and parcel of its adherence to a particular,
traditional, reactive model of judge-centered lawmaking.  That adherence, as we have argued, is
144 For efforts in that vein, see Judith Burns, SEC Warns of Uncoordinated Inquiries, WALL. ST. J., Sep. 10,
2003, at C14 (noting complaint by SEC chairman that states official act for political gain and compromise federal
investigations in the process); Morgan Stanley Case Illustrates States’ Strategy, WALL. ST. J., Jul. 15, 2003 at C1
(noting passage of bill by House Financial Services subcommittee that would weaken states’ ability to regulate
securities industry). 
145 In fiscal year 2003, the division had 438 positions.  See www.sec.gov/news/testomony/ts072303pd.htm. 
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an adaptation to the federalist landscape in which it operates. To deviate in response to some felt
necessity would probably be wrong headed.  If Delaware were to try to out-reform Congress and
the Securities and Exchange Commission, it would be bound to lose because of its inherent
disadvantage in legitimating the provision of national law.  
Contrast, in this respect, Delaware’s passivity with the activity of Eliot Spitzer, who has
managed to sideline the SEC on several fronts.  Spitzer is the Attorney General is one of the
largest states, the geographic home of the major stock exchanges and investment banks and of
numerous investors.  As such, Spitzer’s democratic legitimacy greatly exceeds Delaware’s.  But
much more importantly, Spitzer, one suspects, is less concerned about preserving New York’s
long-term regulatory powers than about dealing with the current crisis and earning the financial
(for the state) and political (for himself) rewards from being visibly on the ball while the
Securities and Exchange Commission was asleep.  Thus, even if, as is likely, the SEC ultimately
reasserts its preeminence in regulating the securities industry and fends off future interference by
state regulators,144 Spitzer will come out a winner.  By contrast, any move by Delaware that
earns it short-term plaudits but undermines its long-term status as corporate domicile would
make it a loser.
 
B. The Symbiotic Relationship between Federal Law and Delaware Law
Delaware’s adherence to a traditional common law model and the rules on jurisdiction
and conflict of laws also constrain its ability to regulate.  Where rules are required (or thought to
be required) that Delaware is unwilling (because it would in tension with the common law
model) or unable (because of jurisdictional and conflict rules) to supply, any such regulations 
would be left to a hodgepodge of state rules or, if a national solution is desirable, would have to
be imposed by the federal government. 
One example of rules that would be difficult for Delaware to supply are the mandatory
disclosure rules imposed by the federal securities laws. Consider, first, the logistical
requirements.  The SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance alone has about 400 employees,145 far
more than the whole of the Chancery and Supreme Courts of Delaware.  To be able to devise a
similarly detailed regulatory regime, Delaware would thus have to change its lawmaking
infrastructure radically.  It could no longer rely on a small body of judicial officers, but would
146 The SEC’s budget is $716 million.  See www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/ Delaware’s entire
budget outlays for the Division of Corporations, the court of chancery and the supreme court is about $10 million.
147 See Romano, supra note 36, at 2402 - 2412 (proposing change in choice-of-law rules to operationalize
proposed state competition over securities regulation).  
148 Securities Exchange Act, §9 and regulations thereunder..
149 Note here special broad rules on venue and jurisdiction in securities lawsuits.  Securities Exchange Act,
§27.
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instead have to establish a major regulatory agency with a number of employees and a budget
closer to the SEC’s.146  
Doing so, however, would generate two problems. First, it would bring to the fore issues
of democratic legitimacy that Delaware would rather have remain obscure. In particular, the
adoption and revision of regulations would entail more explicit law-making – and thus make
controversial political and normative choices more manifest –  than the present mode. Second,
adopting a comprehensive regulatory regime would be hampered by conflicts rules and
jurisdictional limitations.  Unlike conflict rules on the internal affairs of a corporation, conflict
rules on disclosure regulations with respect to the issuance and trading of securities do not point
to state of incorporation as applicable.147 In addition, Delaware lacks personal jurisdiction over
various parties subject to the federal regime, such as broker/dealers, 5% shareholders,
shareholders engaged in secondary offerings of securities, shareholders who solicit proxies,
accounting firms, and employees engaged in insider trading.  Delaware courts would thus lack
the ability to enforce the regulatory regime on these parties, which would be likely to diminish
greatly the effectiveness of any regulatory structure.
More generally, there are several types of rules that Delaware is unlikely to supply and
where federal regulation may (if the requisite rules are indeed efficient) be desirable. The first
type concerns issues where prevailing state conflict rules do not point to the state of
incorporation.  These include, for example, fraud in connection with the sale of securities under
Section 11 of the Securities Act and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act or the
manipulation of security prices.148 
The second type concerns issues where individual states cannot constitutionally exercise
personal jurisdiction over the relevant defendants.149 Regulations under the Williams Act of
bidders and 5% shareholders, regulations of broker/dealers, disclosure requirements for large
shareholders under Section 16 of the Exchange Act, the prohibition against “insider” trading
under the misappropriation theory are examples of rules that Delaware could not effectively
enforce because its courts would lack the requisite personal jurisdiction over most defendants. 
The third type concerns issues where public enforcement is preferable to private
enforcement. This includes misconduct that is so severe than criminal penalties are warranted
and prophylactic rules where enforcement though an administrative agency is superior to private
150 Reg. FD, Rule 102.
151 Cite.
152  In the recent scandals, for example, greater blame was given to the SEC than to Delaware.  See, e.g.,
Stephen Labaton, Praise to Scorn: Mercurial Ride Of S.E.C. Chief, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, at 1.
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enforcement. An example of the latter may be rules against selective disclosure of information
like Regulation FD, violations of which may be publicly enforced but cannot form the basis of a
private lawsuit.150
The fourth type concerns issues where a detailed rule-based ex ante regulatory regime is
desirable. An example may be the adoption of accounting rules guiding the manner in which a
company must disclose financial information, other specific disclosure obligations, or specific
rules exempting certain companies, securities, or transactions from certain obligations. 
The fifth type concerns issues which are so openly political that they cannot be
effectively adopted through a common-law judge-made system.  An example would be the
institution of a codetermination regime, as it prevails in Germany, where employees have
substantial representation of the board of directors.  A U.S. example might be the adoption of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which prohibited the payment of bribes, without regard to their
effect on the firm.151
Finally, our analysis points to a sixth type of issue that Delaware, although it may be able
to regulate as effectively as a federal lawmaker, would gladly yield to the feds.   These are issues
that are both inherently difficult to regulate effectively and are particularly likely to trigger a
populist response.  The prime example of such a “hot potato” issue is executive compensation, a
topic regulated (ineffectively) by both federal and state law that regularly invites populist anger
over the stellar income of (not always stellar performing) executives.
Federal law in any of these areas does not necessarily undermine Delaware’s position as
national provider of corporate law. To the contrary.  If Delaware is not able to regulate certain
conduct effectively, it is probably in its interest to have this conduct regulated on the federal
level (or by other states) to fill the lacunae in its own law.  Without such federal regulation,
continued and unsanctioned wrongdoing could result in a populist backlash against Delaware as
the provider of an ineffective regulatory regime and lead to a wholesale replacement of Delaware
law.  Federal regulation can thus strengthen Delaware’s long-term position in two ways.  First,
by making the system as a whole less scandal-prone, thus reducing the likelihood of a populist
attack.  Second, to the extent that scandals nevertheless ensue, a federal regulatory system
provides an alternative target – a lightening rod from Delaware’s perspective – for a populist
attack.  Indeed, the federal regime – being more openly political, partisan, and publicly enforced
– may well make a more inviting target than Delaware.152 
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Thus, while Delaware lives under the constant threat of federal preemption, there is as
well a significant symbiotic element to the relationship between federal and Delaware law. 
Delaware benefits from federal regulation, as long as it is in the right areas and of the right sort. 
Conclusion
The recent corporate scandals, and the various reactions of the different regulatory actors,
provide an opportunity to tease out some important features of our corporate law federalism. In
this Article, we have argued that Delaware corporate law, and Delaware’s reaction to corporate
crises, must be analyzed from within the institutional and political landscape in which
Delaware’s regulatory powers coexist with, and can be constrained by, the powers of the federal
government and the various other states. From this perspective, the seemingly archaic 19th
century common law style of Delaware corporate law making can be understood as a creative
use of anachronism, as an invocation of apolitical technocratic expertise as a way of making up
for an arguable lack of democratic legitimacy.  At the same time, the scope of Delaware’s law is
crafted in a way that minimizes conflicts with other jurisdictions.  Because of the constraints
placed on Delaware by the federalist structure, the relation between federal law and Delaware
law can be best understand as symbiotic as well as antagonistic.  Although Delaware is
threatened by federal preemption, it is also served by federal regulations that regulate areas
which Delaware cannot regulate effectively and thus help ward-off crises or provide a lightening
rod for a populist backlash which could produce more severe harm.
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